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Nothing Recedes Like Success?




The field of systematic risk assessment is still young, and as might
be expected, many of the disciplines that most need to be brought into
risk assessments are not yet fully represented. An area of particular
weakness concerns the social sciences - those that focus on the
systematic study of human behavior. To date, it has been common to
assume that the "proper" roles for social science are limited to risk
management 1 or risk communication. 2 The field has been much
slower in drawing on social science expertise as a part of risk
assessment, including the estimation of probabilities and consequences
of hazard events. Unfortunately, as this paper will illustrate, this
omission is one that is likely to lead to errors in the assessments -
errors that are particularly pernicious because they are so often
unforeseen.
* Based in part on a paper presented at the October 1989 Annual meeting of the
Society for Risk Analysis, San Francisco. Portions were prepared under funding from
the U.S. Dept. Energy, administered by the Nuclear Waste Transportation Center,
University of Nevada-Las Vegas. The author also appreciates several helpful
suggestions from Caron Chess, Lee Clark, Robert Halstead, and Paul Slovic. The
views presented in this paper, however, are strictly his own.
** Professor Freudenburg has a B.A. (Communication) from the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln and M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. (Sociology) from Yale University.
He teaches in the Department of Rural Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison and is a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of RISK.
1 E.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTn MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
2 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION (1989).
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The focus of this paper will be on technological risks that are in
some way managed by humans and their institutions (governments,
corporations, communities) over time - particularly over relatively
extended periods of years, decades, or even centuries. Problems are
especially likely to emerge in connection with some of the very kinds of
technological developments that have often provoked some of the
greatest outcry from members of the general public. These are
developments with high levels of what Slovic 3 has called "dread"
potential, particularly the potential to produce massive consequences in
the event of accidents, even though such accidents have often been
judged by members of the risk analysis community to have only
miniscule probabilities of occurrence. Such intense public reactions
have, in the past, often inspired equally intense reactions, in turn, from
members of the technical community, sometimes with the claim that the
public is displaying "irrationality," 4 and often with the complaint that
such public perceptions are completely out of line with "real" risks.
Increasingly, however, the field of risk assessment has been
acknowledging that risk assessments are at best quite imperfect
representations of "reality. ' 5 This paper will argue that, in the future,
those of us who produce risk assessments will need to be still more
circumspect in our readiness to believe the numbers we produce.
3 Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENcE 280 (1987).
4 DuPont, The Nuclear Power Phobia, Business Week 14 (Sept. 7, 1981);
Cohen, Criteria for Technology Acceptability, 5 RISK ANALYSIS 1 (1985).
5 Clarke, Politics and Bias in Risk Assessment, 25 Soc. ScI. J. 155 (1988)
[hereinafter Politics and Bias]; Clarke, Explaining Choices Among Technological
Risks, 35 Soc. PROBLEMS 22 (1988) [hereinafter Explaining Choices]; FISCHHOFF,
LICHTENSTEIN, SLOVIC, DERBY & KEENEY, ACCEPrABLE RISK (1981) [hereinafter
ACCEPrTABLE RISK]; Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson &
Ratick, The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK
ANALYSIS 177 (1988) [hereinafter Social Amplification of Risk]; Freudenburg,
Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the Art of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment, 242 SCIENCE 44 (1988); Perrow, The Habit of Courting Disaster, The
Nation 1 (Oct. 11, 1986).
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Given the nature of this paper's focus, several caveats are in order.
First, to say that probabilistic risk assessments may be deserving of less
statistical confidence - and that the views of the general public may
need to be seen with less scientific contempt - should not in any way
be-taken as implying that those of us who engage in risk assessment are
in any way failing to "give it our best shot." Nothing in this paper
should be taken as implying an accusation of conscious bias among risk
assessment practitioners; to the contrary. Most practitioners generally do
appear to be well intentioned, ethical, and professional individuals -
many if not most of whom take pains to err, if at all, on the side of
conservatism. The problems of the field appear not to be those of
intention, but of omission. Second, while a listing of omissions and
weaknesses is, by its nature, likely to be read as quite critical in tone,
the criticisms expressed herein are explicitly intended to be constructive
ones; they are being offered here in the interest of improving the field,
not disbanding it.
Third, while the call of this paper is for the systematic use of social
science in risk analysis, this should be seen as a natural extension of the
truly significant ains and improvements that have already been made.
Risk assessors, particularly in the past few years, have made important
progress in considering potential complicating factors and in beginning
to recognize the often-considerable uncertainty that often exists,
particularly as assessments draw more heavily on expert opinion instead
of empirical evidence. As a result of changes already made, many of the
most glaring errors of early risk assessments are already well on their
way to being corrected, the intention behind this paper is to contribute to
a continuation of that process. Fourth and finally, to stress an earlier
point, this paper focuses on technological risks that are managed by
humans and their institutions over time. The logic reported here may or
may not apply to other areas of risk assessment, such as dose
extrapolation; further analysis and examination will be required before
such decisions can be made.
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Social Science in Risk Assessment
Persons with physical or biological science backgrounds often
express surprise at the presence of social scientists in risk assessment,
wondering aloud how such "nontechnical" fields could possibly
contribute to the accurate assessment of risks. Aside from the fact that
the social sciences are often highly technical - and scientific - the
more straightforward response is that human activities cannot be
overlooked by any field that hopes to be accurate in its assessments of
risks, particularly in the case of technological risks.
At a minimum, humans and their organizations will enter into the
arena of technological risks in at least two places - in the assessing of
risks and in the operation of risk-related systems. The problems
created by human fallibilities in the process of risk assessment - i.e.,
by what amounts to "'human error' in risk estimation techniques ' 6 -
have begun to be the focus of other publications. 7 The effort in this
paper will be to bring greater analytical attention to the operation of risk-
related systems - that is, to the management and operation of risk-
related institutions over time.
Institutions, however, are more than just collections of individuals.
One common problem for persons who do not have background or
training in the social sciences - as well as for some who do - is the
tendency to focus so strongly on individual motivations and behaviors
that collective or structural factors are simply overlooked. While the
assumption is rarely made explicit, the common fallacy is to assume
that, when things go wrong, "it is because some individual screwed
up," to quote a comment from a member of the audience at a recent risk
conference.
6 Freudenburg, supra note 5, at 45.
7 E.g., Politics and Bias, supra note 5; Explaining Choices, supra note 5;
Clark & Majone, The Critical Appraisal of Scientific Inquiries with Policy
Implications, 10 ScI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 6 (1985); Egan, To Err Is Human
Factors, 85 U'cH. Rv. 23 (1982); AcCEPTABLE RISK, supra note 5.
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Unfortunately like many assumptions, this one is plausible but often
wrong. In fact, as sociologists in particular have long known, many of
the most unfortunate outcomes in history have refiflected what Merton's
classic article8 termed the "unanticipated consequences of purposive
social action." Problems, in short, can be created not just by
individuals, but by institutions, and not just by volitions, but by
situations.
The Organizational Amplification of Risks
Due in part to the publication of a paper on the topic by Kasperson
and his associates9 and in part to the practical significance of the topic,
"the social amplification of risk" has begun to receive increasing
attention in the risk analysis community. As the authors of that paper
have carefully pointed out, what is at stake is the amplification of risk,
not merely of risk perceptions. Their analysis noted the ways a given
risk event can send "signals" to a broader community through such
processes as becoming the focus of attention in the media. To date,
however, there has been little analysis of the ways in which the
probabilities of the initiating "risk events" themselves can be amplified
by the very organizations and institutions having responsibility to
operate a technology or regulate its safety.
While a great deal of attention has already gone into the conscious or
volitional activities that can be undertaken to manage risks more
successfully - and indeed, while it is probably the case that, in general,
the net effect of such conscious attention to safety is to lessen the
risks10 - a far greater problem may exist with respect to aspects of
organizational functioning that are unintended and/or unseen. At the risk
of some oversimplification, organizational functioning will be discussed
8 Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM.
Soc. REv. 894 (1936).
9 Social Amplification of Risk, supra note 5.
10 But see Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really too Conservative? Revising the
Revisionists, 14 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 427 (1989).
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here in terms of four sets of factors that have received insufficient
attention in the literature to date. The four include individual-level
human factors, organizational factors, the atrophy of vigilance, and the
imbalanced distribution of institutional resources.
A. Individual-Level Failures and "Human Factors"
Three sets of individual-level human factors require attention -
errors of individual culpability, errors that are predictable only in a more
probabilistic sense, and the actions of persons who are external to the
systems normally considered in risk assessments to date. The broad
range of "human factors" that are traceable to the actions of
organizations, rather than individuals, will be discussed in section B,
below.
1. "Standard" human factors. "Human error" is a value-laden term,
one that has often been used to describe situations that might more
appropriately be blamed on mismatches between people and
machinery. 11 In general, to the extent to which human behaviors have
been considered in risk analyses to date, the focus generally has been on
problems of individual workers, ranging from insufficient levels of
capability (due to limited intelligence, inadequate training, and absence
of necessary talents, etc.) to factors that are often associated with low
levels of motivation (laziness, sloppiness, use of alcohol/drugs, etc.).
As a rule, these individual-level human factors share three
characteristics. First, they are commonly seen as the "fault" of the
individual workers involved, rather than of any larger organizational
systems. 12 Second, they tend by their nature to be preventable and/or
correctable. Third, these kinds of "human error" are often identified by
official investigations that are conducted after accidents and
technological disasters, as having been key, underlying, causal
11 Egan, supra note 7; Flynn, The Local Impacts of Three Mile Island, in PUBLIC
REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR POWER: ARE THERE CRITICAL MASSES? 205 (W.
Freudenburg & E. Rosa eds. 1984); Freudenburg, supra note 5.
12 E.g., Szasz, Accident Proneness: The Career of an Ideological Concept, 4
PSYCH. & SOCIAL THEORY 25 (1984).
Freudenburg: Nothing Recedes Like Success? 7
factors.13
At the risk of emphasizing the obvious, it needs to be noted that the
potential range and significance of human errors could scarcely be
overemphasized-but can readily be overlooked. As the common saying
has it, "It's hard to make anything idiot-proof - idiots are far too
clever." The problem is particularly pernicious in the case of systems
that are estimated to have extremely low probabilities of failure, as noted
below. Given that these individual-level human factors receive at least
some degree of attention in the existing risk literature, this paper will
move instead to other categories of human behavior that appear to
require greater attention in the future.
2. "Stochastic" human factors. Aside from the fact that certain
individuals may indeed have insufficient capacities and/or motivations to
perform the jobs they are expected to do, there is limited but growing
evidence that many of the technological systems involving both humans
and hardware are likely to encounter what might be called "stochastically
predictable" problems. Even among workers who are intelligent,
properly trained, and motivated, there is a potential for fatigue, negative
responses to stress, occasional errors in judgments, or prosaically
predictable "bad days." This category of problems can be described as
"stochastically predictable" in that virtually anyone with even a modest
familiarity with human behavior knows that an unfortunate event often
"happens," as the recent bumper sticker puts it, but it is only possible in
a statistical or probabilistic sense to "predict" the exact problem/mistake,
the person committing that mistake, or the time of commission.
Accidents are more likely to occur in the five hours after midnight than
in the same number of hours before, for example, but beyond such
statistical generalizations, the specific problems and their time(s) of
occurrence appear to be almost completely chaotic or random.
13 E.g., U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REPORT NO. OTA-SET-304,
TRANSPORTATIONOF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (1986); D. GOLDING & A. WHITE,
GUIDEU4EsONTHE SCOPE, CONTENT AND USE OF COMPREHENSIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
INTHE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH LEvE NUCLEAR WASrE TRANSPORTATION (1989).
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If there is an exception, it is in the way in which much of the work
in technological systems is structured. Intriguingly, it is possible that
typical or "engineering" responses to this problem may tend in fact to
make it worse: There may be something like a generic difficulty for
humans in maintaining attentiveness to jobs that amount to little more
than routine monitoring of the equipment that "runs" a system except in
times of emergency - as in the kinds of jobs sometimes described,
with reason, as involving "99% boredom and 1% sheer terror." Yet
these are precisely the kinds of systems often developed in response to
failures of human vigilance. The limited available research on
human/technological systems that have avoided error more successfully,
such as aircraft carriers, 14 generally suggests instead that most people
do better if the systems they operate require them to remain attentive,
even at the cost of considerable tension or pressure.
3. "External" human factors. As noted elsewhere 1 5 and
occasionally considered at least in a qualitative way in risk assessments,
problems can also be created by the actions of persons who are external
to a technological system itself. The most commonly considered
examples of "external" human factors have to do with terrorism and/or
sabotage activities, whether instigated by disgruntled former employees,
social movements that are opposed to a given technology, or other types
of persons or groups. While the U.S. has been quite fortunate to date in
avoiding most forms of overt terrorism, closer examination might reveal
that the odds of such deliberate intrusions are too great to be safely
ignored; the annual risk of terrorist activities at a controversial facility,
for example, might be well over one in a hundred, rather than being less
than one in a million.16
14 Rochlin, LaPorte & Roberts, The Self-Designing High Reliability
Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea, 40 NAvAL WAR C. R. 76
(1987).
15 E.g., Freudenburg, supra note 5.
16 Id. See also, Holdren, The Nuclear Power Controversy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COLLOQIUMONT-m SCIENCE COURT, 170, at 172 (1976).
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Other kinds of "external" intervention may be even more likely; the
possibilities range from acts of neighbors to acts of Congress. At least
some observers have concluded that the infamous Love Canal incident,
for example, was due not just to the actions by Hooker Chemical
Company, which filled a trench with its waste chemicals, but also to
later real estate and urban development. After filling the trench, Hooker
Chemical covered the site with a layer of clay and then deeded it to the
local school district for $1.00; it was after that time that construction and
even excavation for homes and highways may have led to considerable
water infiltration, which later led to the "leaking" of the chemicals from
the waste site into neighborhood homes.17
Perhaps somewhere in the middle of the continuum of culpability,
between deliberately malicious actions by terrorist groups and relatively
naive actions by ignorant neighbors, would be actions that reflect
political and/or economic motivations. A recent example is provided by
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,18 which established a national
policy for disposing high-level nuclear wastes, and which was passed
only after a long, careful, and highly visible debate in the halls of
Congress. Amendments to the Act, however, have been passed with
much less public scrutiny and much more speed, largely due to the use
of last-minute amendments to appropriations bills. The Nuclear Waste
Policy Act Amendments of December 198719 "amended" the process
of site selection to the extent of discarding the policy itself (studying
three sites extensively before picking the best one). The new bill -
described by the Governor of Nevada less formally as the "screw
Nevada bill" - directed the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to
proceed with the study of a specific site in Nevada, not even considering
other sites until or unless the first site would be found to be unsuitable.
17 For a fuller discussion, see A. LEvINE, LovE CANAL: SCrENCE, PoLrrIcs AND
PEOPLE (1982).
18 42U.S.C. §10101 et seq. (1988).
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10172, and 10172a (1988).
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In the next two Federal fiscal years, the Chair of the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee for Energy and Water Projects engineered
further amendments, imposing severe constraints on what, under the
original legislation, was supposed to have been an "independent" study
program under the control of the State of Nevada. The appropriation for
fiscal year 1989 - passed less than two weeks before the start of the
state fiscal year to which it applied - cut by 50% the level of support
for the study program that had already been negotiated between the state
and DOE; the surprise amendment even named specific studies for
which the state was forbidden to spend more than specified amounts. 20
The appropriation for fiscal year 1990 effectively cut even this reduced
appropriation by roughly 90%. While one of the arguments for these
cuts in Nevada's independent research capability was that the DOE was
already carrying out a research program of the highest possible quality,
the Secretary of Energy was later to reach a very different conclusion,
announcing that his Department's research during the period covered by
the amendments had been so seriously deficient that the entire research
program essentially needed to be "started over."2 1
Against a backdrop such as this, it may not be prudent to assume
that, where the safety of a facility or site will depend in part on actions
to be taken by elected or appointed officials many years in the future, the
policies in existence at the time when a risk assessment is done will be
the policies actually followed at those future times. As a relatively
straightforward illustration, imagine you are a Senator and the year is
2010. The Federal budget deficit is a major issue - still. Your
constituents are demanding a variety of services, ranging from plans to
build new jet-ports to the need for retirement/health care facilities for
aging baby-boomers. You face a tough re-election campaign next year.
Taxes are "already" too high - still. In this context, when an official
20 Wald, Congress May Cut Waste Site Funds: Move Could Hurt Nevada Bid to
Show It Is Unsuitable for the Nuclear Dump, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, at A14.
21 Wald, U.S. Will Start Over on Planning for Nevada Nuclear Waste Dump,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1989, at A.1.
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from the future "Department of Environmental Remediation" testifies
reluctantly that her agency will need an additional $82.5 billion "to fulfill
a promise we made to the American people back in 1990" - for
example, to clean up the messy results of a series of mistakes in a thinly
populated western state - which would you choose to do: fulfill
someone else's ancient promise to that far-away state, or fulfill your
recent campaign promise to bring more jet-ports to your own? At a
minimum, it appears, the likelihood of future fulfillment of promises
should be taken as something less than a certainty; under many
conditions, in fact, the probability may even prove to be under 50%. An
assessment that fails to deal with the predictability of such problems is
likely to prove no more realistic than one that ignores biological factors
or assumes that water will normally run uphill.
B. Organizational Failures and "Organizational Factors"
In addition to the actions of individual humans, however, the actions
of organizations can have a far greater influence on real risks than has
been recognized in the risk assessment literature to date. Partly to
preserve a symmetry with the common discussions of "human factors"
- most of which have to do with characteristics of individuals - this
paper will refer to this second set of considerations as "organizational
factors." As will be noted, there are a number of ways in which such
organizational factors need to be seen as expected, rather than as
"excepted," for purposes of our analyses. It appears that our
organizations are faced with a perplexing panoply of systematic
organizational/institutional factors, the net result of which will be to
increase, rather than decrease, the "real" risks posed by technological
systems.
1. Organizational variations in commitment to risk management.
Just as individuals can differ greatly in terms of personality,
competence, motivation, and so forth, so too can organizations. Some
organizations manage to operate nuclear power plants efficiently, safely,
and with a high level of availability; others are less successful. Some
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organizations make a genuine commitment to worker safety and
environmental protection; others do little more than go through the
motions. All of this is hardly new information for the risk assessment
community; unfortunately, it is information that is still too often ignored
in our analyses. While informal discussions among risk specialists often
center around the problems of organizations having less-than-impressive
levels of commitment to safety and risk management, what shows up in
the conversations often disappears from the calculations. Risk analyses
tend to have difficulty quantifying the uncomfortable fact that
organizations' standard operating procedures are sometimes more likely
to be ignored than to be followed, particularly when it comes to
procedures that are intended to improve the safety of an operation rather
than to boost the rate of production.
This collective oversight is more than a matter of mere academic or
incidental interest; in some cases, in fact, the lack of organizational
commitment to risk management may be a predominant source of real
risk. Particularly in the case of "technological" failures that have
received widespread public attention, such organizational factors are so
common that the field can no longer afford to ignore them - if indeed it
ever could. To turn to some by-now familiar cases, the President's
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island22 began its
investigation looking for problems of hardware, but wound up
concluding the overall problem was one of humans - a pervasive
"mind-set" in the nuclear industry at the time, reflecting a problem of
organizational hubris that contributed substantially to the likelihood of
accidents. At least according to some of the reports in the popular press,
the accident at Chernobyl took place while the plant was operating with
important safety systems disabled.23 The explosion of the space shuttle
22 pRESEM COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE
LEOACYOFTHREE MILE IsLAND (1979).
23 E.g., Norman, Chernobyl: Errors and Design Flaws, 233 SCIENCE 1029
(1986); Fialka, Soviets Blame Nuclear Disaster on Technicians, Wall St. J., Aug.
18, 1986, at 23.
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Challenger has been attributed in large part to the "push" at NASA, the
space agency, for getting shuttle missions launched on a regular
schedule. 24 The later accident with the Exxon Valdez has been
described even by the Wall Street Journal as reflecting a relatively
pervasive lack of concern by both Exxon and Alyeska with the
companies' own risk management plans.2 5
This list could be expanded, but the purpose here is not to point
fingers at specific cases of organizational failure; rather it is to raise the
point that, if we wish our risk analyses to be guided by scientifically
credible, empirical evidence, rather than by wishful thinking about the
way the world "should" look, we cannot responsibly accept any risk
analysis that treats such common problems of organizational errors as if
they simply do not exist. If we make the apparently innocuous
assumption that organizations will function "as envisioned" in official
plans, we may actually be making one of the most unreasonable
assumptions possible - a "best-case" assumption that may only apply
to a tiny fraction of real-world organizations, doing even that only
imperfectly and only part of the time.26
2. Bureaucratic attenuation of information flows. In addition to
factors that may affect only some organizations, however, there are also
factors that appear to influence virtually all organizations, particularly
the larger ones. One of the simplest factors has to do with the
attenuation of information flows. Consider a recent accident that "should
not have occurred:" the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. A
number of investigations after the incident called attention to the fact that
the people with technical know-how had expressed concern, sometimes
24 See e.g., Vaughn, Regulating Risk:Implications of the Challenger Accident,
11 L. POL'Y 330 (1989).
25 McCoy, Broken Promises: Alyeska Record Shows How Big Oil Neglected
Alaskan Environment, Wall St. J., July 6, 1989, at Al, A4; Marshall, Valdez: The
Predicted Oil Spill, 244 ScIENcE 20 (1989).
26 L. Clarke, Organizational Foresight and the Exxon Oil Spill (1989)
(unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, Rutgers University).
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quite forcibly, about the potential dangers of launching the Challenger
under low-temperature conditions, while the persons at the top of the
organization reported never having heard anything about such concerns.
These investigations, in turn, prompted any number of responses, most
of which were variations on the question, "How could that be ?"
For anyone who has studied organizations, at least part of the
answer is quite simple, and, while it does not rule out the possibility of
irresponsibility, neither does it require us to conclude that any conscious
cover-up actions were involved. The basic fact is that communication is
always an imperfect process, and the greater the number of "links" in a
communication chain, the greater the likelihood that important pieces of
the information will fail to get through. The common illustration of
rumor transmission provides an example: If a "secret" is whispered to
one person, who then transmits it to another, who transmits it to still
another, the message if often unrecognizable by the time it gets around
the room. It is also possible to illustrate the problem quantitatively:2 7 If
we make the relatively generous assumption that there will be a 0.7
correlation between what any given person in an organization knows
and what that same person's supervisor will know about the same issue,
this means that just two organizational "links" would reduce the
correlation between the specialists' understanding of a technology and
their supervisors' to less than 0.5 (0.7 x 0.7 = 0.49), and seven links
would reduce the correlation to less than 0.1 (0.77 = .082).
In some organizations, moreover, the bureaucratic attenuation will
be even more severe, particularly in the case of "bad news." While
organizations may no longer literally follow the practice of executing the
bearers of bad news, most people do not enjoy hearing bad news, and
the disinclination to be confronted by discouraging words may be
especially high in organizations characterized by a strong commitment to
goals. Goal commitment is generally helpful or functional for an
organization - it helps people to work harder and in a more coordinated
27 Freudenburg, supra note 5.
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fashion, for example - but it tends to exacerbate an unfortunate
problem with respect to risk management. "Don't tell me about
problems," supervisors are sometimes heard to say, "Tell me what we
can do about them." Unfortunately, in the case of many areas of risk
management, what the organization can do about a risk is often
something the organization would rather not do. To return to the
Challenger accident, technicians who suspected there would be
problems with the 0-ring seals, particularly at low temperatures, could
have suggested (and did) that the launch be delayed for warmer
temperatures. Such a step, however, would have put the agency further
behind in its ambitious launch schedule. Completely redesigning the
problematic seals, as the agency later did, would have created both
delays and costs of a magnitude that clearly would have been considered
unacceptable - at least until after the agency experienced the
unfortunate alternative. To make matters still worse, the voices of
caution are often referring to accidents that could happen, not that will
happen - to probabilities that are uncomfortably high rather than to
those that are certainties. It is one thing to risk the wrath of one's goal-
oriented superior when one is convinced that a given course of action
will lead to disaster, it is quite another to risk acquiring the reputation as
a person who cries "wolfW" about a problem that may still have a 70%
probability of not occurring. Overall, both the Challenger disaster and
the broader body of experience with organizational behavior would tend
to suggest that when the problems being identified are serious and
unpopular, and when the available "solutions" are even less acceptable,
the outcome is likely to be a systematic filtering of bad news and a
corresponding "emphasis on the positive" in the news that is actually
passed up the chain of command to superiors' superiors.
3. Diffraction of responsibility. In addition to creating a possibility
that a given piece of known information will fail to get through,
organizations can create a significant possibility that an important piece
of information will remain unknown or unrecognized. In essence,
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complexity can help to create the organizational equivalent of Catch-22:
The specialized division of responsibility creates not just the possibility
that a single weak link will cause the entire "chain" to fail, but it also
increases the possibility that one or more links will have been forgotten
altogether. Not only is each office or division expected to do its job
properly - to make its own "link" of the chain adequately strong - but
each is freed of responsibility for other links of the chain. The common,
if generally understandable excuse, becomes, "That's not my
department."
The not-my-department problem appears likely to be especially
severe in the very kinds of large and complex organizations that have
been evolved to manage "advanced" technological systems. Catton2 8
refers to what he calls "corporate gaps" in providing this account of Air
New Zealand 901, a sightseeing flight that flew directly into the north
face of Mount Erebus, an Antarctic volcano. While "pilot error" was the
first explanation offered by authorities, the facts of the case proved to be
more complex:29
When the plane collided with the mountain, killing
everyone on board, it was flying in clear air, beneath a cloud
ceiling that diffused the daylight in a way that made the
upward sloping white surface of the mountain directly ahead
indistinguishable from the horizontal white expanse all five
pairs of eyes in the plane's cockpit had every reason to
suppose they were seeing. According to the destination
coordinates the pilot had been given in his preflight briefing,
they were on a safe route down the middle of ice-covered
McMurdo Sound. Due to changed destination coordinates
the airline's Navigation Section had inserted into the
aircraft's computer, they were instead flying toward a point
lying directly behind the mountain.
28 Catton, Jr., Emile Who and the Division of What?, 28 Soc. PERSP. 251, 264
(1985).
29 p. MAHON, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE IND THE CRASH ON
MOUNTEREBUS, ANTARCTICA OFA DCl0 AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY AIR NEWZEALAND
Lvri (1981).
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It was not the job of the person who had "corrected" a
supposed error in the flight plan to notify the pilot that a
change of coordinates had been made. It was not the
computer programmer's job to inspect the pilot's navigation
chart to see if his preflight briefing had agreed with the
information going into the Inertial Navigation System
computer. It was not the responsibility of the Williams field
controller to ask the pilot whether his preflight briefing and
his computer held the same information. It happened from
the division of labor and it was nobody's fault. Two
hundred fifty-seven lives fell through the cracks.
In fact, the diffraction of responsibility may be something close to a
generic problem in the management of technological systems. Some
cases appear to present examples, at least, of severe deficiencies, as in
some of DOE's own investigations of the firms running its nuclear
weapons facilities, 3 0 and in other cases, observers may detect
something closer to a deliberate denial or abrogation of
responsibility, 31 reacting to it with a form of indignation. While the
widely scattered assignment of responsibility may create gaps that are
technically "nobody's fault," after all, many observers will be likely to
conclude that there was at least some conscious intent to free the
individual actors or departments from bearing responsibility for the
collective consequences of their combined actions.
The intent of the present discussion, however, is to point out that
important considerations can "slip through the cracks" unintentionally,
as well, and in two ways. First, given that the complexity of
technological systems can make it virtually impossible to foresee all of
the ways in which problems might arise, the obvious implication is that
managers of the system may prove unable to assign responsibility for
components of the system that might prove later to be crucial. Second,
the complexity of the organization itself can create difficulties,
30 See the summary in Wartzman, Chain Reaction: Rockwell Bomb Plant is
Repeatedly Accused of Poor Safety Record, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1989, at Al.
31 Cf. Bella, Organizations and Systematic Distortions of Information, 113 J.
PROF. IsSUES ENGINERIG 117 (1987).
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oversights, omissions, and lacunae of responsibilities. As the recently
retired supervising engineer of a large project once explained to this
author,32
The damned plant has got so many ways of going wrong
that nobody really knows what they all are, not even me.
Back when I first started, if I worked on a car, I not only
knew how my part of the system worked - I knew how the
whole thing worked. On this project, we're lucky if the
various teams even know how their own parts of the plant
are supposed to work, and nobody but God Almighty really
knows how the whole thing fits together.
4. Loyalty, vulnerability and amplified risk-taking. As Heimer3 3
has noted, a number of less notorious but often still tragic industrial
accidents have occurred when workers were taking risks that everyone,
at least in retrospect, would agree the workers should not have been
taking. As she correctly points out, the recurrent nature of this
phenomenon suggests the utility of asking whether some underlying
factors might be at work. Drawing on the significant literature on risk
perceptions, which indicates that most people are extremely reluctant to
take risks in pursuit of financial gain, she notes there is little reason to
believe that the workers were taking such risks in hopes of increasing
their salaries. Instead, she suggests, these workers were taking risks for
much the same reason as many other people take risks - to avoid
losses, in this case specifically including the "losses" represented by
being laid off or fired.34
Note that it is decidedly not necessary for persons at the top of an
organization to have issued orders to ignore or override safety concerns
for persons lower in the organization to behave as if precisely such
orders had been given. One of the basic assumptions of a corporate
control structure of the U.S. model is that persons at the top of an
32 Private conversation; speaker prefers anonymity.
33 Heimer, Social Structure, Psychology and the Estimation of Risk, 14 ANN.
Rnv. Soc. 491 (1988).
34 Id
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organization establish the policies, and those lower down have the
responsibility of deciding how such policies and goals are to be brought
to fruition. Excessively loyal subordinates, such as the Reagan
administration's John Poindexter, may even go so far as to discern the
value for their superiors of "plausible deniability" - the ability to say, if
the need ever arises, that they had no awareness of the specific steps
their subordinates were taking to implement their overall directives.35
While most observers seem to feel that the actions of John
Poindexter were excessive, there is little debate about the value of loyal
employees in general, particularly about those who "know what needs
to be done, and do it without asking." In many cases - for example, in
the face of the deadline or an impending storm - there literally may be
no time to clear one's actions with supervisors before proceeding. Even
if no one in the organization has ever said the workers should take on
unnecessary risks, however, corporate leaders rarely complain about
employees who do too much for the firm, more often voicing
complaints about those who do too little. While such amplified risk-
taking may be seen as desirable or deplorable, depending on the values
of the observer, the point here is not so much how the pattern is seen,
but rather that, for analytical purposes, it needs to be seen instead of
ignored.
C. The Atrophy of Vigilance
At a still broader level of abstraction, there is a need to consider
what would be expected to happen to organizational commitment to risk
management over time, particularly in the case of rare or "unexpected"
problems. Even in an organization with an above-average commitment
to safety, and one where managers seek not to put pressure on workers
to cut corners, it appears that the normal pattern will be for attentiveness
and vigilance to atrophy over time. There are at least three key
mechanisms behind this expectation - only one of which has to do
with the predictability of complacency among individuals. At the
35 Cf. Bella, supra note 31.
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organizational level, further problems are introduced by matters as
mundane as cost controls and as unexpected as goal displacement.
1. Complacency and boredom. At least since the time when an
iceberg got the best of the "unsinkable" Titanic, most ships' crews have
presumably been operating at an increased level of caution and alertness
for at least their first trips through iceberg-infested waters. Adrenaline,
however, does not keep on pumping forever. While the ships coming in
and out of the Alyeska pipeline terminal in Valdez admittedly had not
been totally immune from problems, the general pattern of experiences
up through 11:59 p.m. on March 23, 1989, scarcely would have raised
concerns about catastrophic failure for most observers. Over 8,000
tankers had gone in and out of the port, over a period of more than a
decade, without a single catastrophic failure. Based on the empirical
track record up to that point, most observers presumably would -have
seen little reason for any particular concern.
Neither, unfortunately, did the crew of the Exxon Valdez. Five
minutes later, however, the incredibly sophisticated tanker had an
incredibly stupid encounter. Despite an array of navigational devices
having a level of sophistication that early sailors could scarcely have
imagined, the largest, newest, and best-equipped tanker owned by
Exxon - one of the largest and most technologically sophisticated
organizations in history - nevertheless managed to hit an obstacle that
was literally miles out of its course and was marked by a flashing red
light. The obstacle was also marked clearly on navigation charts, and it
had been known by sailors for more than two centuries; the earliest
sailors in the area had named it after the same Captain Bligh who was
later to achieve a different kind of notoriety as the victim of a mutiny on
the HMS Bounty. The accident, coincidentally, took place during the
200th anniversary year of the mutiny.
In many ways, the eras before and after the stroke of midnight on
Good Friday, 1989 - years of reasonably successful operation,
followed by the largest oil spill in U.S. history - could scarcely seem
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more disparate. In another sense, however, perhaps they could not have
been more closely related. It is entirely possible that the accident of
Good Friday, 1989, would not have occurred but for the tragic
complacency engendered by the dozen good years that had passed
before. More specifically, it may have been the very "success" of earlier
trips in and out of Prince William Sound - literally thousands of them
- that helped to make possible a situation where the captain had retired
to his quarters, the ship was under the control of a third mate who
would not have been expected by a formal risk assessment to be at the
helm and the Coast Guard personnel on duty were not bothering to
monitor even the lower-power radar screens that remained at their
disposal after cost-cutting efforts of a few years earlier. In the wake of
the reduced vigilance, however, some 11 million gallons of crude oil
fouled nearly a thousand miles of once-pristine shoreline.
2. "Non-prodictive" status of safety measures. Virtually all
institutions, public or private, are likely to face periodic pressures to
control costs. The sources of pressure may include competition, a desire
to increase profits, responses to cost overruns, political or other
pressures to "cut down on waste and inefficiency," or simply a laudable
desire to do more with less. Whatever the original source of the pressure
or the nature of the organization, at least one of the responses is likely to
be consistent: Organizations will generally seek to protect what they
consider to be their core functions and to cut back on those they
consider peripheral.
There is a tremendous range of variation across organizations in
what the "core" functions are considered to be - from building cars to
busting criminals - but there is virtually no organization for which
increasing the safety of its own operations is the primary or central
goal. Instead, protection of health, safety and the environment tend to be
secondary or "while" concerns: Organizations seek to produce energy
"while" protecting the environment, operate submarines while providing
an adequate level of protection for the crew, dispose of wastes "in an
environmentally acceptable manner," and so forth. Almost never is risk
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management included in the first half of the sentence, at least in the
description of overall organizational goals, as in "increasing the level of
safety for workers and nearby communities 'while' maintaining
adequate profit margins" - unless it is when risk management
professionals use such terminology in the attempt to increase their
organizations' attentiveness to issues of risk and safety.
The consequences of occupying organizationally peripheral
positions, unfortunately, also show up in ways that are not just
linguistic. To return to the Exxon Valdez, a series of reports in major
news outlets36 reveal what can happen. From one report:37
Dozens of interviews with former officials and safety
officers, along with a study of state records and original
contingency proposals, indicate that a plan to avert a tanker
disaster was developed a decade ago and then gradually
dismantled piece by piece.... Factors include
* Rejection by the Coast Guard and Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company... of a 1976 state study that forecast
tanker accidents and urged such requirements as double-
hulled tankers and tug boat escort beyond Bligh Reef....
* Two cutbacks in recent years that probably removed an
extra pair of eyes that might have spotted the off-course
Valdez. In 1978, the Coast Guard reduced the distance that
local pilots had to guide departing tankers and, since 1984,
the Coast Guard has cut its radar staff in Valdez to 36 from
60, reduced the radar wattage and decreased the distance
required for radar monitoring....
- Disbandment in 1982 of the Emergency Response
Team for Alyeska. ... Spill-fighting equipment on hand was
below the minimum required; even the barge designated to
carry containment booms and supplies was in dry dock....
* Carelessness by the state agency charged with keeping
Alyeska in compliance. The crash in oil prices in 1986
36 E.g., Bartimus, Spencer, Foster & McCartney, Greed, Neglect Primed Oil
Spill, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 9, 1989, at 1, 15 [hereinafter Greed, Neglect
Primed Oil Spill]; Church, The Big Spill: Bred from Complacency, the Valdez
Fiasco goes from Bad to Worse to Worst Possible, Time 38 (Apr. 10, 1989).
37 Greed, Neglect Primed Oil Spill, supra note 36.
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forced state budget cuts that reduced the work week at the
Department of Environmental Conservation to 4 days.
Figure 1
The Atrophy of Vigilance
accident accident
Time -)'
While this is only an example, it does illustrate at least two main
points. First, there is more than a little irony in the fact that, if some
organization's risk management activities had succeeded in averting the
disaster, no one would ever have "known." In the absence of disaster,
in fact, risk-management functions often seem to be superfluous; only
the occurrence of a disaster provides incontrovertible proof that
disaster-prevention activities are "necessary." Rather than suggesting
that risk-management functions will generally receive the resources they
"need," in fact, incidents such as the Exxon Valdez suggest a much
more disquieting possibility: In the absence of truly frightening "close
calls," or even in cases where close calls occur but are interpreted to
mean that current measures "worked" and no further measures need to
be taken,38 perhaps the general tendency of organizations is to cut back
38 Bier & Mosleh, The Analysis of Accident Precursors and Near Misses:
Implications for Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 27 RELIABILITY
ENGINEMRNG & SYSTM SAFETY 91 (1990); Tamuz, When Close Calls Count:
Enhancing Organizational Learning About Risk, Presented at annual meeting of
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on risk-management expenditures until an accident provides proof that
the cuts were too severe. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation
of the logic being suggested here.
Second, no "magic solutions" may be available. Neither a
straightforward reliance on "private enterprise" (Exxon) nor on "public
servants" (state, federal agencies) would appear to offer reason for
complacency. Both private- and public-sector actors cut "unnecessary"
costs for risk-management activities that might have helped to avert the
disaster. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, the consortium of the oil
companies that runs the pipeline, might be expected by the uninitiated to
provide a somewhat higher level of commitment to risk management, in
that its employees would be administratively removed at least to some
degree from the "pressures for profit" that would be more likely to
characterize the oil companies themselves. If anything, however,
Alyeska has come in for harsher criticism than Exxon itself. This may
not be entirely accidental; in the words of one resident of southeast
Alaska (a critic of both Exxon and Alyeska), "Alyeska isn't the place
where any of the oil companies send their best people. You're never
going to become the president of your company by way of working for
Alyeska." It may also be worth noting in this context that corporate
presidents often come from sales, production or even legal or
accounting branches of a finn, but rarely if ever from the in-house office
of risk management.
3. Displacement and routinization. As if to make matters still
worse, virtually all organizations also have some difficulty with
means/ends reversals and goal displacement: Whether a division of an
organization was set up originally to protect health, clean up pollution,
or find and develop oil reserves profitably, the persons in that division
often come, over time, to devote an increasing share of their attention to
"bureaucratic" concerns. Over time, in other words, the "real" goals of a
department can come to focus on what were once seen simply as means
Society for Risk Analysis, New Orleans, October 8, 1990.
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to an end - on increasing the size of the departmental budget, for
example, or on attempting to purchase new equipment for a given
office. A second form of displacement takes place when organizational
accounting comes to focus on resources expended rather than results
accomplished: Particularly in government agencies having hard-to-
measure goals, such as "improving health care for the aged" or
"protecting the public health and welfare," an emphasis on
accountability often becomes an emphasis instead on accounting
measures - number of clients seen, rather than the improvement of
health for each, or number of regulations issued, rather than
improvements in the actual level of operating safety of power plants,
transportation systems, and the like. While the problem of displacement
is well-known in studies of organizations and in evaluation research, it
has not yet received proper attention in risk analysis, particularly with
respect to systems whose safety is likely to depend in part on the
exercise of long-term vigilance by future organizations.
A particularly important form of means/ends displacement has to do
with the importance of routinization - particularly in cases where we
are trying to predict organizational responses to the accidents that do
indeed occur. Problems are likely to be especially severe for the
accidents that are the "least routine" or most rare - specifically
including the implementation of contingency plans for low-probability
events.
In the case of the Alaska oil spill, the "drills" on emergency
preparedness conducted before the spill might have suggested to astute
observers the need for greater attention to spill response. Neither the
equipment nor the organizations worked as planned, and the drills
"sometimes were near-disasters themselves."' 39 Such lessons,
however, were evidently overlooked. As Clarke40 has cogently noted,
at least five contingency plans were in effect at the time of the spill.
39 McCoy, Broken Promises: Alyeska Record Shows How Big Oil Neglected
Alaskan Environment, Wall St. J., July 6, 1989, at Al, A4.
40 Clarke, supra note 26.
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Among other commonalities, each envisioned not only that rescue and
response equipment would be at the ready, but also that materials would
be deployed in a carefully coordinated manner, with "an efficient and
effective division of labor among organizations" being instituted almost
immediately. At least in the plans, communication channels among
previously competitive or even adversarial organizations would be
established readily, interpretations of the communications would be
unproblematic, and each organization or agency would take precisely the
right step at precisely the right time to fit the need of other organizations.
The reality, of course, could scarcely have been less similar to the
plans. Confusion seems to have been far more commonplace than
communication; a number of important steps either failed to be taken or
else fell through the interorganizational cracks. Rather than coordinating
their activities as effectively as the components of a well-designed
computer program, the various organizations with a stake in the spill
and the clean-up often seemed to have more interest in blaming one
another than in working with one another. Particularly during the
critical, first few days, virtually the only effective response to the spill
came not from any of the organizations having contingency plans, but
from the fishermen of the region; rather than worrying about which
organization or office ought to take responsibility for what, the
fishermen essentially ignored such bureaucratic niceties and went to
work - locating oil "booms" in Norway, arranging to have them
transported to Cordova, Alaska, and then coordinating their deployment
to protect critical hatchery and habitat areas. In short, the fishermen may
have responded more effectively, even without the benefits of
established plans and experience in emergency drills, than organizational
actors who not only had such benefits but also access to far greater
financial resources. 4 1
As Clarke suggests, it may not have been an accident that the most
effective early response to the spill came from outside of established
41 See the fuller discussion in Clarke, supra note 26.
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organizations. Rather than indicating a "lack" of organization, Clarke
suggests, the ineffective response to the spill from Exxon, Alyeska, and
state and federal agencies may in fact reflect a case of "over-
organization:" 42
One of the reasons we build organizations is to simplify
decisions. It is in the nature of organizations to institute
routines for handling decisions. These routines then become
the templates through which organizations filter information,
and hence organize action. Organizations are, in fact,
organized to be inflexible. This means that organizations are
organized to do some things well and other things poorly....
Exxon is well-prepared for Arctic exploration, oil
management, and political influence. It is less well-prepared
for crisis management.... If organizations were infinitely
flexible, they would generally be ineffective in day-to-day
operations.
Clarke's point is a critically important one, and readers are urged to
reflect on its applicability to familiar organizational contexts. Virtually all
of the persons within an organization are likely to have complained at
some time of being "overworked," or of having too many demands
placed upon them, relative to the resources with which they are
provided. In fact, it is essentially part of the job description of an
efficient manager to get the department to do more with less; if
complaints of overwork are not forthcoming, some observers would
take this as indicating that the manager might not be pushing the
department hard enough. When the available resources provide "not
quite enough to go around," however, the best guess is that functions
seen by the department as less central or more peripheral - such as
keeping oil spill clean-up equipment at the ready, as opposed to filling
the oil tankers quickly - will be among the first to slip.
Like the research scientist who "already has enough to do" when a
departmental chair suggests the instigation of a new research project, the
various branches of an organization are likely to feel they are already
42 Clarke, supra note 26, at 26-27.
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fully committed when a new challenge suddenly bursts on the scene.
Firemen may (or may not) be ready for the unexpected when it occurs,
patiently waiting for the opportunity to deal with the next fire or
emergency, but few other organizations or persons would be likely to fit
such a description. When new challenges and emergencies do arise,
moreover, they are likely to be viewed not just with an eye to the
organization's stated goals, but'also with an eye to the implications for
next year's budget, for the ongoing turf wars with competing or
complementary organizations, and/or for the question of what other
person or division might be induced to take on the added workload
instead.
D. Imbalances in the Distribution of Institutional Resources
Still other factors that have largely been overlooked in past work
have to do with the unequal distribution of and access to resources. Two
factors appear to have important if generally unforeseen implications for
risk management.
1. Mismatches between opposing sides. Persons in the risk policy
community may often feel beleaguered and outnumbered, given the
presence of unflattering media coverage on one side and often-hostile
public groups on another. A number of the publications in the field
make reference to this problem, although generally without providing
specifics. Douglas and Wildavasky,4 3 for example, claim that local
opposition groups "are difficult to defeat because there are so many of
them and they do not stay in one place."
A closer look at the facts, however, suggests that the imbalance of
resources actually works strongly to the favor of industrial interests and
"the risk establishment."44 In terms of financial resources, many of the
industries that have been the focus of the most intense public outcry on
risk issues - nuclear power, offshore oil development, and waste
disposal, among others - control vast financial resources. Meanwhile,
43 M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVASKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECiION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENvIRONMENTAL DANGERS 172 (1982).
44 T. DETZ& R. RYcROFr, THE RISK PROFESSIONALS (1988).
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the citizen groups that organize to oppose such developments - the
greatly feared "NIMBY" or "Not In My Back Yard" groups - are
generally in a position of needing to raise revenues through modest
activities such as bake sales and car washes.
When it comes to the control of scientific resources, in particular,
the resource advantage of industrial interests is virtually complete. A
large number of scientists already work for industrial employers, often
on a full-time basis. Yet, there are virtually no citizen groups, except at
the national level, that can afford to hire even one scientist on a full-time
basis. Even then, scientists working for national environmental or
public-interest groups have often done so partly out of a sense of
commitment and receive levels of pay significantly lower than would be
commonly available to persons of comparable training and experience in
private industry.
As Dietz and his colleagues45 point out, this imbalance of resources
may prove to have particularly important consequences to the extent to
which the risk-management debate follows the adversarial model of
decision making: If a quantitative risk assessment is performed on a
large and profitable industrial enterprise such as the development and
transport of oil, we can be reasonably sure that the industry involved
will have the necessary scientific resources to scrutinize the assessment
and point out ways in which the calculations may have resulted in a risk
estimate that is "too high," but it will be a rare citizens' group, indeed,
with the resources necessary to do a complementary technical analysis to
identify errors leading to a risk estimate that is "too low." In short,
despite risk assessors' best efforts to be "conservative," errors and
omissions may mean that calculated risk estimates will still wind up
being insufficiently conservative to reflect empirical reality.
2. Limitations on the roles performed by neutral parties. If there is
indeed a David-versus-Goliath mismatch in resources between the
45 Dietz, Frey & Rosa, Risk, Technology and Society, in HANDBOOK OF
ENviRONmENTAL SOCIOLOGY (R. Dunlap & W. Michelson eds. forthcoming).
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opponents and proponents of new industrial developments, this would
appear to place far greater importance on the role played by parties that
might ordinarily be expected to be "in the middle." Three such sets of
actors can be identified readily: The media, government agencies, and
"independent" sources of expertise, such as universities and some
research institutes.
Media coverage often seems to scientists to be "anti-science" in its
orientation, but studies that have actually documented the nature and
extent of coverage generally wind up finding no empirical evidence to
support the presumed bias.4 6 Aside from the fact that most studies
show media coverage to have little effect on public views, beyond
helping to "set the public agenda,"' 4 7 a number of authors have
concluded that the actual direction of media bias is pro-industry, not
anti-industry. 4 8 Overall, it appears that environmental or safety-
oriented groups may have an advantage in some respects - colorful
representatives, or the David-versus-Goliath "angle," for example -
but that these advantages are probably more than counterbalanced by the
advantages and resources available to industry groups. The latter include
the availability of lobbyists and full-time public relations personnel, the
ability to spend large sums of money on advertising, and the fact that
industry groups are "repeat players" rather than "one-shotters". 4 9
46 E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND, supra note 22; see
also P. TICHENOR, G. DONOHUE & C. OITEN, COMMUNITY CONFLICT AND THE PRESS
(1980); Tyler & Cook, The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk: Distinguishing
Impact on Personal and Societal Level Judgments, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCH. 693 (1984).
47 Kraus & Davis, Political Debates, in HANDBOOK OF POITICAL COMMUNICATION
273 (D. Nimmo & K. Sanders eds. 1981); McCombs, The Agenda-Setting
Approach, id., 121-40; but see also, A. MAZUR, THE DYNAMICS OF TECHNICAL
CONTROVERSY (1981).
48 Molotch, Oil in Santa Barbara and Power in America, 40 Soc. INQUIRY 131
(1970), Molotch, Media and Movements, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
71 (M. Zald & J. McCarthy eds. 1979); E. HERMAN & N. CHOMSKY, THE
MANUFACURE OF CONsENT. THE POLrnCAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988).
49 Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
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Industrial representatives are more likely to have pre-existing
relationships with persons who work in the media, to be accessible to
reporters who have time to make only one quick telephone call before a
deadline, and to have at least a degree of presumed legitimacy as
spokespersons who, whatever their faults or biases, tend to be well-
informed on the issues that are of concern to them.50
Government agencies are certainly no strangers to the imposition of
excessive, arbitrary, or overly burdensome regulations, and so in that
sense, they would indeed seem to qualify as neutral parties - indeed, at
times, they may also seem to be distinctly anti-industry in their actions
and orientations. In a broader perspective, however, government
agencies are more commonly seen by organizational analysts as subject
to "capture" by the industries they are set up to regulate.5 1 Criticisms
range from the "revolving door" argument - the claim that too many
officials wind up moving back and forth between jobs in regulatory
agencies and jobs in the industries they regulate, usually with the latter
being at higher salaries - to the fact that regulators simply spend much
of their "public" interaction time in meeting with persons from the
regulated industries, who after all would have an interest in making sure
that the regulators are fully aware of the ways in which regulations are
seen by the industry, rather than in dealing with members of the broader
public. 52 Yet, there may also be problems that are far more subtle than
outright "capture." 53 A regulatory agency is often forced to come up
with a specific number (or level of exposure) to be treated as the
dividing line between "safe" and "unsafe." As risk assessors are well
50 Stallings, Media Disclosure and the Social Construction of Risk, 37 Soc.
PROBS. 80 (1990).
51 Cf. A. SCHNAIBERG, THE ENvIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUSTO SCARCITY (1980);
G. MCCONNELL, PRivATE POWER AND AMEmICAN DEMOCRACY (1970).
52 Cf. Friesema & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental
Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. REs. J. 339 (1976).
53 Freudenburg & Pastor, Public Responses to Technological Risks: Toward a
Sociological Perspective, SOCIOLOGICAL Q. (forthcoming).
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aware, however, science rarely provides such neat dividing lines. An
industry's costs of complying with regulations can often be stated with
at least apparent precision, but the "best" level of protection is almost
always open to debate. While many citizens hope that agencies would
give "the benefit of a doubt" to the protection of public health and safety
in cases where the evidence is ambiguous and the experts are in
disagreement, the agencies are likely to face considerable (and effective)
pressure from affected industries not to impose regulations unless they
can be shown to be unambiguously justified.
Nor can university-based scientists be considered immune to
criticism. While this paper itself can be taken as an illustration of the fact
that scientists employed in academic settings have considerable freedom
to develop and then express the kinds of analyses that may be expected
to be unpopular with industrial interests - the paper having been
written by a tenured professor with a "hard-money appointment" at a
Big-Ten university - a number of important analyses have concluded
that, on balance, even the scientists who work in university settings are
significantly more likely to be supportive of industrial interests than
critical of them. In particular, Schnaiberg54 has noted that the
"production" sciences (those that help industries to produce or to
compete more profitably or efficiently) tend to receive far higher levels
of support than do the "impact" sciences, namely those that examine the
potentially negative social or environmental impacts likely to be created
by the development of such technologies. 55
The production/impact investment imbalance is not merely a matter
of corporate support for science, moreover, but includes as well the
support from federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture or even the National Science Foundation. The disparity in
levels of funding is almost invariably on the order of 20:1 or more, and
54 A. SCHNA]BERG, supra note 51.
55 See also J. KLOPPENBURG, FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
BicracoLoGy 1492-2000 (1988).
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the average disparity may in fact be closer to the order of 100:1. At least
according to Schnaiberg's analysis, scientists who are naturally attuned
to doing "production" science will generally tend to receive far higher
levels of funding than "impact" scientists of equal scientific
competence, will be able to support or produce larger numbers of
graduate students, will have larger and better-equipped laboratories, and
in general, will be able to do what appears to be (and may actually be)
"better science." Under the assumption that most scientists-in-training
are rational people who want to be able to do good science, it follows
that even university-based scientific departments, over time, will do a
far better job of promoting and rewarding the performance of scientific
research that advances industrial interests than of the otherwise equally
"worthwhile" science that would deal with concerns likely to be raised
by the opponents of a technology.
Concluding Thoughts:
Biasing Pressures, Seen and Unseen
At the risk of stressing the obvious, literally all of the factors thus
far identified in this paper are of the sort that would be expected to lead
to the underestimation of "real risks" even by scientists who are well-
meaning, honest, and not aware of any pressures to produce biased
* results. Those of us who work for "establishment" organizations often
criticize the objectivity of critics who work for environmental or "public
interest" groups, arguing that the political positions and interests of such
groups may have influenced the findings and the arguments of the
scientists they employ; -but, if there is a potential for biasing pressures in
one direction, there may also be similar pressures in the other direction.
Given that scientists are far more likely to work for industrial interests
than for groups of opponents, as noted above, the "tangible" pressures
toward bias may make the problem worse.
At the risk of offering another observation that "everybody already
knows," the real world is often not so free from "unscientific" pressures
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on scientists as we might like. Perrow56 provides a relatively critical
examination of cases where industrial representatives have understated
known risks.57 The publications of environmental groups often focus
heavily on cases in which industrial or governmental representatives
have lied about or covered up credible evidence about risks to the public
health and safety. While such organizations would presumably have an
interest in encouraging a high or even exaggerated sense of the
likelihood or frequency of such incidents, recent examples of
"unfortunate" organizational behaviors originally brought to broader
attention through the efforts of such activist groups include the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probe of DOE's facility at Rocky Flats,
Colorado, resulting eventually in a raid on the facility by federal
enforcement agents and the filing of criminal charges. Discussions of
such problems in the risk assessment literature are understandably
rare,58 and yet the problems may be too significant to ignore.
The point here, however, is not to dwell on such clear-cut cases of
unscientific behavior by scientists, regrettable though each of them may
be. Instead, it is to note that this entire paper has been written from the
perspective of a loyal member of the risk assessment community, one
who not only wishes to minimize the likelihood of such unprofessional
behaviors by scientists but who also believes, on the basis of first-hand
observations, that the vast majority of scientists are indeed careful,
honest and scrupulous, often to a fault. The problem, in short, is not
56 Perrow, The Habit of Courting Disaster, The Nation 1 (Oct. 11, 1986).
57 See also Politics and Bias, supra note 5; Explaining Choices, supra note 5;
Freudenburg, Risk and Recreancy: Weber, the Division of Labor, and the
Rationality of Risk Perceptions, presented at the 12th annual Department of Energy
Conference on Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Chicago, August 1990; Sterling &
Arundel, Are Regulations Needed to Hold Experts Accountable for Contributing
'Biased' Briefs of Reports that Affect Public Policies?, in RISK ANALYSIS IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR 285 (C. Whipple & V. Covello eds. 1985); Stoffle, Traugott,
Harshbarger, Jensen, Evans & Drury, Risk Perception Shadows: The
Superconducting Super Collider in Michigan, 10 PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY 6(1988).
58 But see Sterling & Arundel, supra note 57.
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that the scientists involved in risk assessment are bad or biased people;
in general, they clearly are not.
Unfortunately, the problems identified in this paper are in some
ways more serious, and more difficult to counteract, than would be the
case if deliberate or even conscious sources of bias were in fact
involved. Instead, the problem is in a variety of more subtle factors -
unseen and unfelt, yet unfortunate in their consequences. These
organizational and institutional factors exert an influence that could
scarcely be more disturbing were deliberate malice actually involved.
Systematically and repeatedly, these factors serve to amplify the "real
risks" we seek to foresee and manage. Given that the field of risk
assessment is committed to doing the best job possible in assessing
risks accurately and fairly, such a systematic set of biasing factors is one
we can no longer afford to ignore - if indeed we ever could.
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